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Abstract. Since 1995, a liberalization  process  - the  so- called  Barcelona  Process-  has  begun  in the 
Mediterranean  area. It aims  at establishing  a free trade  area  for  2010  in the  Mediterranean  Basin. 
For  the  moment  the  full  liberalization  concerns  industrial  products  trade  whereas  agriculture  
remains  sensitive. Among  agricultural  products,  the  fruit  and  vegetables  (F&V) sector  is essential  
for   Mediterranean   countries   and   the   EU  is   their   first   trading   partner.   In   this   context,   two 
questions  arise: Firstly, to what  extent  protection  influence  trade  for the med  countries, compared  
to  the  other  countries?  Secondly,  what  would  be  the  impacts  of a greater  liberalization  on  F&V 
trade  between  the EU and  Mediterranean  Countries?  
Our  model, based  on  the  new developments  of gravity  equation  focuses  on  the  difficulties  faced  
by the  Mediterranean  countries  to  enter  on  the  EU market,  compared  to  the  other  EU partners,  
considering  the  relative impact  of the  different  trade  costs.  It is estimated  at the  product  level, in 
a sector  with  a huge  specificity: some  products  may be very perishable  and  thus  particularly  time  
sensitive.  The  Mediterranean  basin  appears  as  a highly  heterogeneous  country  bloc.  Beside  the  
actual  level of preferences  allowed  by the  EU, two main  elements  vary according  to the  exporting  
country:  its  tariff  sensitivity  and  its  “non- tariff”  trade  resistance.  Thus,  with  respect  to  the 
Euromed  liberalization,  the  higher  the  tariff  sensitivity  the  higher  the  impact  of liberalization  on 
trade  and  this impact  can be limited  by a high trade  resistance  (NTB, logistic constraints…).
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Introduction
Since 1995, a liberalization  process  – the so- called  Barcelona  Process  -  has  begun  in the 
Mediterranean   area.   It   aims   at   establishing   a   free   trade   area   for   2010   in   the  
Mediterranean  Basin.  For  the  Mediterranean  countries,  in  the  agricultural  sector,  the  
main  issue  of  the  process  is  firstly  the  supply  of  basic  commodities  (cereal,  dairy  
products),  that  are  essentially  imported  from  the  EU, and  secondly  a better  access  for 
their  fruit  and  vegetable  exports  to the  European  market.  These  products  represent  the  
main  exports  of these  countries  and  the  European  Union  is their  first  trading  partner.  
On the other  side, for the European  Union, the main  concern  in the Barcelona  process  is 
not  only the  promotion  of its  cereal  and  dairy  exports  but  also  the  protection  of fruit  
and  vegetable  European  producers.  Indeed,  the regulation  of trade  with  third  countries,  
in the  fruit  and  vegetable  sector,  is the  key element  in the  common  organization  of the 
market.  It has  several  objectives,  the  first  being  of course  the  protection  of European  
producers  in a sensitive  sector,  where  productions  are  most  often  highly  seasonalized  
and  where  perishable  products  are difficult  to stock.
For the  moment  this  partnership  is only  based  on  bilateral  trade  agreements  between  
the  European  Union  and  each  Mediterranean  country  and  the  full  liberalization  only 
concerns   industrial   products   whereas  agriculture   remains   sensitive,   particularly   the 
fruits  and  vegetables  (F&V). Thus,  Mediterranean  countries  still have  to  face  important  
trade   barriers   when   exporting   agricultural   (horticultural)   products   to   the   European  
market   despite   the   preferences   allowed   by   the   EU  these   last   years.   Indeed,   the  
2agreements  only provide  limited  concessions  for each  partner  for precise  products  and  
limited  quantities  and  calendars.
Within  this  context,  two  questions  rises.  Firstly,  to  what  extent  European  protections  
influence  fruit  and  vegetables  trade?  Secondly, what  would  be the  impacts  of a greater  
liberalization   of   fruit   and   vegetables   trade   on   Mediterranean   exports   of   fruit   and  
vegetables  to  the  EU? In other  words,  what  is the  trade  potential  of the  Mediterranean  
Countries  to the European  market?  
To   answer   these   questions,   the   objective   of   the   paper   is   to   analyze   the   main  
determinants  of the  European  market  access  of fruit  and  vegetables,  by using  a gravity 
model.  It focuses  on  the  constraints  faced  by the  Mediterranean  countries  to  enter  on 
the  EU market,  considering  the  impact  of the  different  trade  costs.  These  “trade  costs”  
(Anderson  and  Van  Wincoop  2005)  include  both  transport  and  border  related  costs  
(tariffs  barriers, non  tariffs  barriers, information  costs  or border  formality  costs).  
The   remainder   of   the   paper   proceeds   as   follows:   Section   1   first   presents   the 
Mediterranean  countries  position  as suppliers  of fruit  and  vegetables  for  the  European  
Union  (EU15), and  then  compares  tariffs  and  preferences  allowed  by the  EU for  these  
different  suppliers.   Section  2 presents  the  theoretical  foundation  of the  gravity model, 
based  on  Anderson  and  Van Wincoop  (2003). This  model  allows  to compare  the  access  
to   the   EU  market   for   the   Mediterranean   Countries   to   the   access   for   the   European  
producers   and   to   the   other   third   countries.   After   a   presentation   of   data   and  
econometric   methodology   implemented   in   the   third   part,   the   fourth   part   provides  
estimation   results,   a   major   result   being   the   heterogeneity   among   Mediterranean  
countries  concerning  the  access  conditions  to  the  European  Market.   Finally, section  5 
concludes.
1. Market access  for fruit and vegetables  coming  from 
Mediterranean  countries  
The European  Union  (EU15) plays  a major  part  in the fruit  and  vegetables  world  market:  
it is both  the  first  importing  (57.65%) and  exporting  (51.33%) area  in  the  world.  The 
intra- European  trade  is  very  important,  accounting  for  77% of  the  EU imports.  The 
Mediterranean  countries  involved  in the Barcelona  Process  (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,  
Lebanon,  Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia  and  Turkey) are the  first  non- European  trading  
partners  of the  EU with  a market  share  of 4.8% that  is similar  as their  market  share  in 
the  world  market.  Their principal  exports  are hazelnuts,  dried  fruits  and  citrus,  but  also  
tomatoes  and  several  vegetables.  Countries  of  Southern  Hemisphere  (Chile,  Uruguay, 
Argentine, South  Africa, Kenya, New Zealand  and  Australia) are also important  suppliers  
(3.14%) of the European  Union (Apple, grapes). The New Members  States  of the European  
Union   (Slovakia,   Slovenia,   Czech   Republic,   Poland,   Lithuania,   Latvia,   Estonia,   Malta, 
Cyprus  and  Hungary) are little exporters  (2%) toward  the EU15 in 2003. 
Table 1. World and European Union suppliers  of fruit and vegetables  in 2003.
World Imports EU Imports
Suppliers Million 
dollars percentage Million 
dollars percentage
EU 46 700 51,33% 40 400 76,99%
NMS 1 490 1,64% 1 050 2,00%
Mediterranean countries 4 090 4,50% 2 510 4,78%
Southern hemisphere  
countries 5 060 5,56% 1 650 3,14%
Rest of the world 33 643 36,98% 6 864 13,08%
Total 90 983 100,00% 52 474 100,00%
Source: COMTRADE database
3Despite  the  Barcelona  process  is commonly  presented  as a regional  agreement,  we must  
keep  in mind  that  the  Mediterranean  basin  is not  a homogeneous  area,  notably  in the 
studied   sector:   beside   very   small   exporters   (Algeria   or   Lebanon),   four   countries   -  
Turkey, Morocco, Israel and  Egypt – play a major  part  in the F&V trade. They account  for 
more  than  95% of  the  F&V exports  of  the  area.  Concerning  the  products,  for  each 
country   trade   is  also  highly   concentrated  around  four   products  -   50% of  the  F&V 
exports.
Table  2. Mediterranean  World and European  Union  suppliers  of fruit and vegetables  
in 2003
World Imports EU Imports
Exporters Million dollars percentage Million dollars percentage
Algeria 17,9 0,44% 15,7 0,52%
Egypt 209 5,11% 119 3,94%
Israel 876 21,43% 757 25,04%
Jordan 149 3,65% 4,2 0,14%
Lebanon 48,7 1,19% 1,1 0,04%
Morocco 561 13,72% 501 16,57%
Syria 202 4,94% 11,1 0,37%
Tunisia 114 2,79% 104 3,44%
Turkey 1 910 46,73% 1 510 49,95%
Total 4 088 100,00% 3 023 100,00%
Source: COMTRADE database
For   the   moment,   the   Euro- Mediterranean   process   is   only   based   on   bilateral   trade  
agreements  between  the  European  Union  and  each  Mediterranean  partner.  The state  of 
progress  of these  negotiations  differs  from  one  country  to  another.  For instance,  the  
agreement  with  Tunisia  was signed  as early as June  1995, Libya has  for the  moment  an 
observer  status  and  no trade  agreements  have been  signed,  and  negotiations  with  Syria 
are  ongoing.  Finally,  other  countries  such  as  Morocco,  Egypt  and  Israel  have  already  
renegotiated  their  initial trade  agreement.  Within  the  framework  of the  negotiations  for  
EU  membership,   Turkey   has   signed   a   Customs   Union   agreement   with   the   EU,  in 
continuation  of association  agreements  signed  as early as 1963. 
Even  if association  agreements  have  been  signed,  not  all products  are  concerned  but  
some   may   benefit   from   other   preferences   granted   within   the   framework   of   other  
preferential  agreements  (notably  the  GSP). Thus,  for  Med  Countries,  the  liberalisation  
process  does  not  only depend  on  the  Barcelona  process  but  also  on  other  agreements.  
So, F&V products  coming  from  Mediterranean  countries  can  enter  on  the  EU market  
either  under  the EU-Med regime  or under  another  preferential  regime  (GSP) or under  the  
MFN regime.  Finally, the  EU-Med preferences  account  only for 25.93% of the  tariff lines  
in the  F&V sector.  Compared  to the  NMS, the  Mediterranean  countries  benefit  less  from  
bilateral  preferences  but  47.30% of their tariff lines may benefit  from  the GSP regime. 
The European  tariffs  applied  to the  Med Countries  are, on average, a little higher  (8.8%) 
than  those  applied  to  the  NMS (8.4%) and  to  the  others  countries  of the  world  (5.2%). 
Since a high  proportion  of their  tariff  lines  are  submitted  to the  MFN regime  (Table 3), 
countries  from  the  Southern  Hemisphere  must  pay  high  tariffs  compared  to  the  other  
countries  – more  than  10%.
 
Hence,  on  average,  Mediterranean  countries  don’t  seem  to  have  high  preferences  for  
their  access  to the  European  market,  despite  the  Barcelona  process.  However, analysing  
preferences  at the  country  level reveals  heterogeneity  among  the  countries.  Concerning  
tariff  regimes  (Table 3), Turkey  and  Lebanon  essentially have bilateral  preferences  (85% 
4and  67% of  tariff  lines)  and  Turkey  don’t  benefit  from  any  GSP preferences.  On  the  
opposite,   83%  of   Israel   tariff   lines   are   submitted   to   the   MFN  regime   without   any 
preference. 
Table  3. Repartition  of tariff lines  (CN10) by country  and tariff regimes  for fruit and 
vegetables  2003  
MFN Bilateral 
preferences GSP Total
Algeria 23% 10% 67% 100%
Egypt 22% 9% 69% 100%
Israel 83% 17% 0% 100%
Jordan 23% 8% 69% 100%
Lebanon 12% 67% 21% 100%
Libya 26% 0% 74% 100%
Morocco 17% 49% 34% 100%
Syria 25% 1% 73% 100%
Tunisia 22% 13% 66% 100%
Turkey 15% 85% 0% 100%
The lines are counted  month  by month
MEDITAR
Concerning  the  level  of  the  protection  applied  by  the  EU, the  heterogeneity  among  
Mediterranean  Countries  remains  also  important  (Graph  2). Turkey,  Lebanon,  but  also  
Morocco  benefit  from  the  lowest  tariffs  while Israel seems  to be submitted,  on average, 
to the highest  protection.
Graph 2.
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To sum  up this  part, it would  appear  that  tariffs  and  trade  are not  systematically linked.  
Hence,  Israel  which  is a major  exporter  on  the  European  market  still has  to  face  high 
5tariffs  and  doesn’t  benefit  from  huge  preferences;  whereas  Lebanon  benefits  from  high 
preferences  and  low tariffs  and  has  a very  low market  share  in the  European  market.  
Other  components  should  explain  trade  to  the  EU.   From  these  results  and  in  the  
context  of the  liberalization,  the  question  to be raised  is how much  exporting  countries  
are sensitive to a decrease  of tariff. Does their  access  to the EU market  depend  on other  
determinants?  To answer  these  questions,  we use  a gravity- type  model,  the  derivation  
of which  is presented  in the following section.
2. The Gravity  Model
  The  Gravity- type  model  is a widespread  model  in international  trade  analysis  which 
permits  to analyze  bilateral  trade  volume  and  nature.  It is applied  for various  purposes  
but  it  is  particularly  used  to  assess  market  access,  trade  resistance  and  impacts  of 
regional agreements.   Indeed, it permits  estimation  of trade  creation  or diversion  in case  
of a regional  agreement  (Nahuis  2004,  Soloaga  and  Winter  1999) and  thus  it brings  an  
important  contribution  to the  regionalism  debate.  On the other  hand,  the  borders  effect  
methodology   (Chen   2004,  Head  and   Mayer   2004,   Mayer  and   Zignago,   2005)   do  an 
analysis  of a market  access  measurement  comparing  imports  from  foreign  countries  to 
imports  from  domestic  producers  in  order  to  have  a benchmark  of  the  best  market  
access  possible,  the  one  faced  by national  producers.  Other  authors  applied  the  model  
to evaluate  trade  resistance  (Péridy, 2005).
Our model  is based  on the new developments  of the gravity equation  made  by Anderson  
and  van  Wincoop  (2005).  We assume  that  consumers  have  identical  and  homothetic  
preferences   and   that   products   are   differentiated   by   origin.   The   representative  
consumers  in country  i maximize  a CES utility function  Uik: 
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Under  the following  budget  constraint:




ijk ijk ijk m m c p                                                          (2)
We denote  i the  importing  country,  j the  exporting  country,  k  the  product,  cijk  the 
consumption  by  i of  product  k from  j and  b jk  consumers’  preference  for  products  k 
coming  from  j.   corresponds  to the  elasticity  of substitution  of imports  of j. P σ ijk is the 
price of good  k coming  from  country  j paid  by consumers  in country  i, m ik is the country  
i expenditure  for good  j. Pijk differ  from  price  in country  of origin  p jk due  to trade  cost  
tijk that  are not  directly observable. We follow the  iceberg  assumption  about  trade  costs  
that  leads:  
ijk jk ijk t p p =                                                                     (3)
The  maximization   of  (1) under   constraints   (2) give the  bilateral  imports  by country  i 
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The general  equilibrium  structure  of the  model  imposes  market  clearance.  We consider  
both  international  and  intranational  trade, so with  xjk production  of good  k by country  j, 
market  clearance  leads  to: 
å å = =
i i
ijk ijk jk m x x                                                              (6)
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We follow Anderson  and  van  Wincoop  2001  using  market  clearance  (7) to solve for the  
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  with  m wk total  expenditure  for  product  k in the  world. 
It corresponds  to  a CES index  of price  competitiveness  of j for  the  good  k. This  index 










is the  price  competitiveness  of  j on  market  i. This  ratio  is weighted  by  the  share  of 
country  i in the total demand.  Introducing  this index in (9), we obtain:
wk jk ik
ijk jk
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We actually  regress  not  the  volume  of bilateral  flow as  in traditional  gravity  equation,  
but  the  index  of relative  bilateral  intensity  IRijk. This  index  compares  the  share  of the 
imports  of good  k coming  from  j in the  total  imports  of i to  the  market  share  of the  
exporter  j in the  international  market.  An index  equal  1 means  that  the  flow of good  k 
between  i and  j is only  determined  by the  size  of the  partners.  A coefficient  different  
from  1 means  that  trade  is determined  by other  factors  than  the  size  (equation  11): if it 
is greater  than  one, it denotes  privileged  trade  links  between  i and  j for good  k whereas  
an index  less  than  one  refer  to trade  resistance  between  the  two  countries  which  could  
be explained  by a low competitiveness  of i, but  also by the trade  costs. 
Trade  costs  tijk are defined  to include  all costs  incurred  in getting  a good  to a final user  
other  than  the  production  of the  good  itself (Anderson  van Wincoop  2004). These  costs  
comprise  transport  costs, tariffs  and  non  tariffs  barriers, but  also  information  costs, the 
use of different  currencies  or the marketing  cost. The main  problem  is to measure  these  
costs  for which  data  are not  always  available. So, this  mandates  capturing  trade  cost  by 
observable  cost  proxies. 
We follow Péridy 2005  and  decompose  trade  costs  into  different  factors: the distance  d ij 
between  i and  j (proxy  of transport  costs), tariffs  applied  by i towards  j for  good  k t ijk 
and  other  border  variables  Bijk that  are  traditionally  used  in gravity  model  in order  to 
take  into  account  information  costs  and  other  elements  that  we  cannot  measure,   as 
common  language, common  frontier, and  common  history. 
73. Data and econometrics
The above theoretical development  leads  to the estimable  gravity equation:
) ln )(ln 1 ( ) ln( ) ln( ) 1 (
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Insofar  as one  of our  objectives  is to assess  the  impact  of different  trade  barriers  and,  
more  precisely, to point  out  those  which  prohibit  trade,  we must  take  into  account  not  
only the  actual  bilateral  trade  but  also  “zero  values”, i.e. all potential  bilateral  flows. In 
this  case  the  suitable  procedure  is to model  the  decisions  that  produce  zero  values  (the 
decision  to  export  or  not),  rather  than  to  use  the  censored  regression  tobit  model  
mechanically,  where  zero  values  are  assumed  to  appear  due  to  censoring  (Maddala, 
1992). Thus,  the  most  appropriate  econometric  method  for  this  purpose  is a Heckman  
procedure  (Heckman,  1979)
The  model  is estimated  on  annual  data  and  in cross  section,  for  the  year  2002  at  the  
product  level -  the  product  level being  defined  in the  FAO nomenclature  (i.e. about  55 
products  for  the  fresh  F&V sector).   We focus  our  analysis  on  EU imports  from  all its 
trading  partners  (EU and  non  EU members  – among  them  Med and  non  Med countries). 
Thus   the   dependent   variable   includes   both  international  ( ijk m )  and   intra- national 
flows  ( iik m ); however,  the  latter  are  not  available  at a so disaggregated  level. Thus,  we 
had  to generate  these  flows  from  the  data  on  production  (coming  from  FAOSTAT) and  
trade  (coming  from  COMTRADE database). For this, we have computed  the balance  sheet  
between   supply   and   demand   for   each   product   and   countries.   This   needs   specific 
attention   on   the   consistency   between   the   two   databases,   taking   into   account   the  
problem   of   re- exportation   which  entails   for   example   that   some   countries   without  
production  can present  important  amount  of exports  for some  products.   
Relative  price are calculated  from  production  price data  of FAOSTAT database  for each 
country  and  product.  Nonetheless,  as data  needed  to calculate  Ajk are  not  available; we 
don’t introduce  this variable in our estimation.  
For the  transport  costs  between  two  countries  – we have  taken  as  proxy  the  distance  
between  the  capitals  of i and  j dij  and  the  internal  distance  calculated  by the  CEPII 1 . 
Because  of the  time  sensitivity  of fruit  and  vegetable,  these  transport  costs  must  be a 
huge  concern  in this  sector; and  the  more  perishable  the  product,  the  higher  the  costs.  
Thus, besides  the  distance  we have introduced  a multinomial  variable  corresponding  to 
the  degree  of perishability  of the  products.  Four groups  have been  made,  using  data  on 
time  keeping,  respiratory  intensity,  and  fragility  from  the  least  (group  1) to  the  most  
perishable  (group  4) (Appendix  1). 
As  far  as  the  contiguity  variable  (Bij)   is  concerned,  we  have  introduced  a dummy  
variable  equal  to 1, if the  two trading  partners  have a common  border,  otherwise  equal 
to 0.  The common  history  has  been  caught  through  the  dummy  colony  equal  to  1, if 
the exporting  country  was a colony of its trading  partner.  
In order  to  take  into  account  all the  preferences  allowed,  tariffs  included  in the  model  
are  applied  tariffs  by the  EU to each  of its trading  partners.  The data  come  from  TARIC 
database  (DG Taxud). Although  the  model  is estimated  on annual  data  and  for the  FAO 
nomenclature,  it is required  to  measure  the  protection  at  the  most  disaggregated  level 
in order  to have a comprehensive  picture  of the protection:  i.e. monthly  data  at the  10-
digit  level of the  combined  nomenclature.   This allows  to catch  variations  of the  tariffs  
1 Available on the CEPII website  : http://www.cepii.fr/
8during  the  year  due  to  the  seasonality  of  protection  and  the  different  calendars  of 
preferences.  Moreover,  the  calculation  of ad- valorem  equivalent  may  be problematic  in 
the  F&V sector,  due  to  the  so  called  entry  price  system  applied  to  some  sensitive  
products  such  as tomatoes,  cucumbers  or citrus…. This system  implies  that  the level of 
protection  depends  on the level of the  import  price. If the  import  price is greater  than  a 
threshold  – the trigger  price – the exporter  only pays  the ad- valorem  part  of the duty. If 
the  price  is  below  the  trigger  price,  the  exporter  has  to  pay  also  a specific  duty.   This  
duty  is at  the  maximum  when  the  price  falls  below  a certain  level, equal  to  92% of the  
trigger  price. Consequently, the  measurement  of the ad- valorem  equivalent  necessitates  
choosing  an import  price. Here, in this  paper,  we have chosen  to measure  the protection  
at  its  maximum  level,  i.e. at  the  92% of  the  trigger  price.  Finally,  for  these  specific 
products,  preferences  allowed  by the  EU may  be either  an  exemption  or a reduction  of 
the ad- valorem  tax, the level of the specific duty  remaining  the same. However, Morocco  
has   negotiated   lower   entry   prices   for   some   products   (tomatoes   and   oranges)   and  
preferences   allowed   to   this   country   are   higher.   In   order   to   catch   this   preferential  
advantage  for  these  products,  we  have  calculated  the  ad- valorem  equivalent  on  the 
Morocco prices. 
Finally, once  the ad valorem  equivalent  is calculated  at the  most  disaggregated  level for 
each  country , we must  aggregate  this  monthly  data  calculated  at  the  10- digit  level of 
the  combined  nomenclature  in annual  data  defined  in the  FAO nomenclature.  We use 
two   ways   of   aggregation.   First,   we   compute   an   arithmetical   tariffs   average   which  
permits  to catch  the  whole protection  applied  during  the  year, even  if some  month,  the  
tariffs  are so high  that  they prevent  imports.  This average  is introduced  in the selection  
part  of our  Heckman  estimation  – probit  part  -  in order  to take  into  account  the overall 
tariff  barrier  applied  at the  entrance  of the  EU market.  In the  second  computation,  the 
average  applied  by the  EU to its trading  partner,  is weighted  by the  monthly  imports  of 
the  EU from  this  country  (by using  COMEXT database).  This  estimation  measures  the  
taxes  really  paid  by the  exporters  when  they  have  entered  the  EU market  in 2002.  We 
introduce   this   measure   in   the   regression   part   of   our   estimation.   Finally,   in   our  
estimation,  we replace  tariffs  tijk  by (1+t ijk) in order  to  avoid  to  loose  observation  for 
which tariffs  are equal to zero.
4. Results
From  an econometric  point  of view, the two modeling  steps  (selection  and  regression  on 
export  volume)  are  not  independent  (value  of the  Chi2), which  justifies  the  use  of the  
Heckman  procedure.    Because,  results  of  the  Probit  are  quite  similar  of  that  of  the  
regression  step,  we only present  the  regression  step  results  of the  Heckman  Procedure  
(table 4).  We’ll present  in the text, the differences  when  necessary. 
9Table 4. Results.
Estimation  by 
zone







. Coeff. Std  
err Sign.




0,026 *** - 0,2 0,026 ***
Exotic good 1,245 0,2 *** 1,635 0,199 ***
Colony 0,886 0,171 *** 1,066 0,166 ***
Common  Border 0,41 0,168 ** 0,237 0,163 NS




*** - 0,78 0,06
2
***
Tariffs  Med Countries   0,119 0,092 NS - - -
Tariffs Morocco  - - - 0,402 0,206 *
Tariffs Israel - - - 0,243 0,175 NS
Tariffs Algeria - - - - 2,83
6
0,757 ***
Tariffs Lebanon - - - - 2,09
8
0,44 ***
Tariffs Tunisia  - - - 0,923 0,225 ***
Tariffs Syria  - - - 0,792 0,387 **
Tariffs Jordan   - - - 0,445 0,374 NS
Tariffs Egypt  - - - - 0,43
8
0,187 **
Tariffs Turkey   - - - 0,357 0,139 **
Tariffs  New Member  States   0,266 0,114 ** 0,033 0,112 NS
Tariffs  Southern  Hemisphere  countries   1,123 0,107 *** 1,226 0,104 ***
Country  dummies
Med Countries 0,685 0,219 *** - - -
Morocco - - - 1,06 0,347 ***
Israel - - - 3,763 0,403 ***
Algeria - - - 0,797 1,693 NS
Lebanon - - - 0,409 0,726 NS
Tunisia - - - - 2,45
1
0,567 ***
Syria - - - - 7,18
3
1,217 ***
Jordan - - - - 0,51
4
1,258 NS
Egypt - - - 1,081 0,447 **
Turkey - - - 0,899 0,322 ***
New Member  State 0,483 0,28 * 0,922 0,274 ***
South  Hemisphere  Countries 1,567 0,264 *** 1,574 0,255 ***
European  Union Border  Effect 1,108 0,205 *** 1,319 0,202 ***
Home Effect 5,605 0,376 *** 5,565 0,367 ***
Distance - 0,99
8
0,074 *** 0,017 0,095 NS
Distance Perishability 2 - - - - 1,31
7
0,1 ***
Distance Perishability 3 - - - - 1,48
9
0,099 ***
Distance Perishability 4 - - - - 1,46
3
0,113 ***
Perishability 2 - 2,09
1
0,129 *** 7,826 0,785 ***
Perishability 3 - 3,27 0,126 *** 8,007 0,764 ***
Perishability 4 - 2,30
6
0,14 *** 8,56 0,844 ***
Constant 8,285 0,659 *** 0,568 0,826 NS
Number of obs 1915 1915
Censored  obs 1022
1
10221




8 Prob >  chi2 0 0
Log likelihood  = - 357
90
- 3514
2 LR test  of indep    chi2(1)     197,9
9
179,0
7  Prob >  chi2  0 0
10Results  for  “classical”  variables  are  in  line  with  expectations  from  a  gravity  model. 
Distance  restricts  trade  between  two  countries.  Conversely,  having  a common  border  
and   a   common   history   (colony)   stimulates   trade   between   partners.   Moreover,   the  
bilateral   price   competitiveness   has   a   significant   impact   on   trade:   the   higher   the  
production  price p ik of the exporting  country  compared  to the internal  price on market  i 
Pik, the  lower the  volume  of exports.  The dummy  “exotic good” is used  in order  to catch  
the  fact  that  some   products  are  not  produced   in   the   EU  countries  and  it  has   the 
expected  sign . 
1. Perishability increases transport costs
Trade  is sensitive  to  perishability  group  (column  1 Table  4). The  more  perishable  the  
products  (from  group  2 to  4), the  greater  the  trade  resistance,  compared  to  the  non-
perishable   products   (group   1).   However,   the   impact   is   greater   for   group   3,   which  
appears  the more  time sensitive. This effect  could  be explained  by the fact that  products  
of group  4 can be exchanged  frozen  which  can reduce  the time sensitivity.  
To assess  the  impact  of perishability  on transport costs  we introduce  interaction  terms  
between   perishability   and   distance   (column   2   table   4).   The   variables   “distance-
perishability”  allow  to  compare  the  impact  of  distance  for  the  different  perishability 
groups,  with group  1 as reference.  The coefficient  of the distance  is not  significant, that  
means  that  the  distance  has  no  impact  for  products  of  group  of  reference  i.e. non  
perishable   products  (group   1).   Conversely,  the   coefficients   of   distance- perishability 
term  are significant  and  high, that  means  that  for the  other  groups  of product  distance  
have an important  effect  on trade.  This relation  is clearer  in the selection  results,  where  
the  more  perishable  the  product,  the  higher  the  impact  of distance  on  probability  to 
trade.  However,  the  coefficient  of  perishability  group  dummies  is  now  positive  and  
significant;  moreover  it is increasing  with  the  degree  of perishability.  As we catch  the 
transport   cost   impact   with   the   distance- perishability   term,   the   perishability   group  
dummies  capture  the product- specialization  effect. Indeed,  products  of groups  2, 3 and  
4 are globally more  exchanged  than  products  if groups  1. 
2. The EU border effect
Our  estimation  displays  a significant  and  important  home  effect of 5.6, and  a notable  
EU border  effect  (1.108).   In other  words,  each  European  country  trades  much  more  
with  itself  than  with  other  countries  (home  effect) and   moreover  European  countries  
import  more  from  the  European  market  than  from  the  rest  of  the  world  (EU border  
effect). 
Coupling  the  perishability  groups  with  the  EU and the  Home  dummy  points  out  the 
importance  of  perishability  of  products  on  trade  resistance  (Table  5). The  perishable  
products  are more  exchanged  within  the EU and  notably within  the national  territory.
Table 5. 
  Coefficient Std err significance
EU - 0,96 0,238 ***
EU Perishability 2 3,169 0,256 ***
EU Perishability 3 2,915 0,25 ***
EU Perishability 4 3,108 0,274 ***
Home 2,373 0,531 ***
Home Perishability 2 4,219 0,64 ***
Home Perishability 3 4,808 0,605 ***
Home Perishability 4 3,949 0,625 ***
3. The access  of Mediterranean  basin  to EU market
11The   first   estimation   (column   1   table   4)   allows   us   to   compare   the  impact   of   the 
European  protection   on  fruit  and  vegetables  flows  coming  from  third  countries,  by 
distinguishing  four   groups  of  countries:  Mediterranean   basin,  Southern  Hemisphere  
countries,  New Member  States  (NMS) and  the  Rest  of the  World  (ROW). Tariffs  have  a 
significant  and  negative impact  on European  import  for the  ROW (-0.921). For the  other  
areas,  the  coefficient  is the  tariff  differential  between  the  given  area  and  the  ROW. For 
example,  for  the  NMS which  coefficient  is  0.266  and  significant,  the  tariff  impact  is 
equal  to  - 0.921+0.266=- 0.655.  Conversely,  tariff  impact  is not  significantly  different  
between   Mediterranean   countries   and   the   rest   of   the   world.   Finally,   for   Southern  
Hemisphere  the positive impact  of European  tariffs  on trade  of fruit  and  vegetables  is a 
puzzling  result  (-0.921+1.123=  0.202). This  should  mean  that  tariffs  stimulate  trade.  
But in fact, this  result  can be explained  by the product  specialization  of these  countries.  
They are  specialized  in highly  protected  products  by the  European  Union, as apples  or 
grapes.    They  can  export  on  European  markets  because  of  their  competitiveness  and  
because  of their production  calendar.
Country  group  dummies  compared  to  EU dummy  catch  the  trade  resistance  that  face 
the  different  areas  to  access  to  the  European  F&V market,  once  taken  into  account  
protections,  transport  costs  and  price competitiveness.  The trade  resistance  for ROW is 
equal to the inverse  of the EU dummy  coefficient  (-1.108). Mediterranean  countries  have  
a  better   access  to  the  European   market   than  the  ROW but  they  still  have   a   trade  
resistance  at  the  entrance  of  the  EU market  (0.685- 1.108=-  0.423)  which  could  be 
explained  by determinants  as  Non  Tariffs  Barriers  or  logistic  constraints...  This  trade  
resistance  is equivalent  for  the  New member  States.  Once  more,  Southern  Hemisphere  
Countries  have a specific advantage  on the European  market.  
4. The heterogeneity  of the Mediterranean  basin
In the  above  results,  tariff  elasticity  for  Mediterranean  area  isn’t different  than  for  the  
rest  of the  world  and  New Member  States.  As noted  in the  first  part  of the  paper,  the  
Mediterranean   basin   is   a   heterogeneous   area   with   respect   to   trade   and   level   of 
protection  applied  at the  entrance  of the  European  market.   The question  is what  is the  
impact  of protection  for each  country  individually? In the  second  column  of table 4, we 
disaggregate   the   Mediterranean   area   in   order   to   refine   the   above   results   for   each  
Mediterranean  country. 
Global   results   on   competitiveness,   production,   consumption,   common   border   and  
history   are   the   same   than   in   the   first   estimation.   EU  border   effect,   home   effect, 
Southern  Hemisphere  effect  remain  the  same,  but  the  new  specification  of the  model  
makes  the coefficient  of tariff non  significant  for the New Member  States.  
As previously, tariff coefficient  for each  country  is compared  to the  coefficient  value  of 
the  ROW. Among  Mediterranean  countries,  we can  distinguish  different  profiles.  Israel 
and  Jordan  coefficient  are not  significant; their tariff elasticity is the same  than  the ROW 
one. Syria’s exports  to the  European  Union  are not  sensitive  to tariffs: the  coefficient  is 
close  to zero     (-0.780+0.792=0.012). For Algeria, Lebanon  and  Egypt the  sensitivity to 
tariff   is   very   high   compared   to   the   ROW.   Conversely   Turkey   and   Morocco   tariff  
sensitivity  is  smoothed.  Lastly,  Tunisia  presents  puzzling  results,  having  a  positive 
coefficient  of tariff sensitivity. 
Concerning  the country  dummies,  Tunisia and  Syria display  a very high trade  resistance: 
especially  for  Syria  (-7.18- 1.319=  - 8,499), which  European  market  access  constraints  
are  not  due  to tariffs.  Algeria, Lebanon  and  Jordan  face the  same  trade  resistance  than  
the  ROW. Finally, on  the  other  side, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco  have a better  access  to the  
EU access  compared  to  ROW but  still have  a trade  resistance.  Conversely, despite  high 
tariffs,  Israel  has  a non  price  competitive  advantage  on  the  EU market  (3.76- 1.319=  
2.441). The Israeli logistic and  organizational  competencies  can be at the origin  of these  
advantages.
12By way  of  a first  conclusion , with  respect  to  the  Euromed  liberalization  process  the  
Mediterranean  area  appears  as  a  highly  heterogeneous  country  bloc. To  assess  the 
potential  impact  of a decrease  of protection,  two  elements  must  be taken  into  account: 
the   tariff   sensitivity   of   the   exporting   country   (tariff   elasticity)   and   its   other   trade  
resistance   (captured  by  the  country   dummies).   The  higher  the  tariff  sensitivity  the 
higher  the  impact  of liberalization  on  trade  and  this  impact  can  be  eroded  by a high  
trade  resistance  (NTB …).
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Israel  and  Egypt  are  the  two  countries  that  may  be  more  sensible  to  a decrease  of 
tariffs,  because  their  exports  have  an  important  elasticity  to  tariffs  and  because  they  
display  important  other  advantage  for  EU market  access,  probably  due  to  logistic  and  
organization   competitiveness.  Morocco   and   Turkey   also   present   other   important  
advantages  but  they display  smaller  elasticity  to tariffs, so they should  be less  sensitive  
to  a decrease  of tariffs  than  Israel  and  Egypt.  Algeria, Lebanon  and Jordan have  high 
tariffs  sensitivity  but  present  a huge  trade  resistance,  even  compared  to the  rest  of the  
world   in   accessing   European   market.   Thus   the   competitiveness   of   these   countries  
depends  not  only on  tariffs,  but  also  on  non- tariffs  components  such  as organization,  
adaptation  to European  norms  or logistic capacities.  Therefore  the  positive  impact  of a 
decrease  of tariffs  may  be canceled  by a non  competitive  position  of these  countries. 
Lastly,  Tunisia   and   Syria  display   also   important   disadvantage   compared   to   other  
countries. 
5. Conclusion  
In order  to  assess  the  impact  of  the  EU-MED trade  liberalization  we  built  a gravity 
model  focused  on  the  EU fruits  and  vegetables  imports.  The  model  is  estimated  on 
annual  data  for the year 2002  at a disaggregated  product  level (using FAO nomenclature  
ending  to 55 products)  and  includes  both  trade  between  EU and  all its trading  partners  
and  intra- EU trade.  The  index  of  relative  bilateral  intensity  in  flows  is  explained  by 
relative  prices  and  “trade  costs”, those  trade  costs  including  distance  and  perishability 
(as proxies  of trans port  cost) and  EU applied  tariffs.  The dummies  allow to catch  trade  
resistance  (with  European  suppliers  as  benchmark),  that  face  the  different  areas  and  
countries  to access  the European  market,  and    advantage  in accessing  European  market  
compared  to the  others  countries  of the  world  (non  price  competitive  advantage ), once 
taken  into  account  protections,  transport  costs, price competitiveness,  common  frontier  
and  common  history.
13A first  set  of conclusions  concerns  the  Mediterranean  area  considered  as  a block.  The 
results   show   that   the   tariff   elasticity   for   the   Mediterranean   area   isn’t   significantly 
different   than   the   one   observed   for   the   Rest   of   the   World.   Concerning  non   price 
competitive  advantage , it appears  that  the  Mediterranean  countries  have a better  access  
to  the  EU than  the  Rest  of the  World  but  that  they  still have  a trade  resistance  at  the  
entrance  on the EU markets,  probably  due  to non- tariffs  component.
A second  set  of  conclusions  shows  that  with  respect  to  the  Euro- Med  liberalization  
process,  the  Mediterranean  area  appears  as  a highly  heterogeneous  bloc.  Israel  is the  
only country  that  does  show  better  non  price  competitive  advantage  on  the  EU market  
than   the   EU  countries   themselves,   revealing   other   advantages   than   prices   such   as 
logistic or organizational  competitiveness.  It has  also the highest  average  tariff and  high  
tariff  elasticity.  Thus  the  impacts  of  liberalization  on  Israeli  exports  should  be  very 
important.  
Morocco  and  Turkey  are  currently  the  two  countries  that  share  the  highest  part  of the  
Euro- Med fruit and  vegetables  market,  and  they benefit  of high preferences  (low tariffs). 
They   are   in   a   medium   position   from   the   point   of   view   of  non   price   competitive 
advantage  and  tariff  elasticities.   Consequently,  the  impact  of liberalization  should  not  
be that  much  positive  for  those  countries,  and  can  even  be jeopardized  by the  erosion  
of their preferences.
 It is also  interesting  to  observe  that  Egypt  is a country  which  displays  important  non  
price  competitive  advantage  and  high  tariff  sensitivity, while current  tariffs  being  quite  
high. Being the  fourth  exporter  in the  market,  the  impact  of liberalization  could  impact  
significantly its exports  but  also the overall volume  of Med exports.
Finally, the  other  Mediterranean  countries  appear  to be in different  situations  one from  
another.  But we should  not  expect  important  impacts  of liberalization  on  their  exports  
because  either  they  show  low  tariff  sensitivity  (Tunisia,  Syria) or  low  current  tariffs  
(Lebanon), or none  of them  present  significant  non  price competitive advantage . 
Several improvements  are foreseen  in this  work. The first  limit concerns  the measure  of 
protection.  As protection  is monthly  defined  and  varies  within  the  year, we use  annual  
arithmetical  average  of protection  for the selection  part  of our  Heckman  estimation  and  
import  weighted  average   for  the  regression   part  of   the   estimation.  However,  some  
month,  tariffs  are so high  that  they  prevent  imports,  what  we cannot  take  into  account  
in the  selection  step  of the  estimation  with  annual  average.    Secondly,  extending  our  
model  over several years  (cross  section  model) could  allow to test  the robustness  of our  
estimations.  
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